Identity assurance, in the context of Federated Identity Management, is the ability for a party to determine, with some level of certainty, that an electronic credential representing an entity - whether a human or a machine, with which it interacts to effect a transaction, can be trusted to actually belong to the entity.
In the case where the entity is a person, identity assurance is the level at which the credential being presented can be trusted to be a proxy for the individual to whom it was issued and not someone else.
The level of certainty one can have about the credential is what is referred to as the "Assurance Level". Assurance Levels (ALs) are the levels of trust associated with a credential as measured by the associated technology, processes, and policy and practice statements. An assurance level describes the degree to which a relying party in an electronic exchange can, after performing certain tests to authenticate (validate) the origin of the exchange, be confident that the identity information being presented by a credential service provider (also referred to as Identity Provider or IdP) actually represents the entity referred to in it and that it is the represented entity which is actually engaging in the exchange.
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Identity assurance, in an online context, is the ability of a Relying Party to determine, with some level of certainty, that a claim to a particular identity made by some entity can be trusted to actually be the claimant's "true" identity. Identity claims are made by presenting an identity credential to the Relying Party. In the case where the entity is a person, this credential may take several forms, including: (a) personally identifiable information such as name, address, birthdate, etc.; (b) an identity proxy such a username, loginID, or email address; and (c) an X.509 digital certificate.
Identity assurance specifically refers to the degree of certainty that an identity assertion made by an Identity Provider to a Relying Party about some person, actually refers to the person who made a claim of identity by presenting an identity credential to the Relying Party. In order to issue this assertion, the Identity Provider must first determine whether or not the claimant possesses and controls an appropriate token, using a predefined authentication protocol. Depending on the outcome of this authentication procedure, the assertion returned to the Relying Party by the Identity Provider allows the Relying Party to decide whether or not to trust that the identity associated with the credential actually "belongs" to the person presenting the credential.
The degree of certainty that a Relying Party can have about the true identity of someone presenting an identity credential, after receiving an identity assertion from an Identity Provider, is what is referred to as the "Assurance Level". Assurance Levels (ALs) are determined by the kinds of technologies, processes, and policies associated with the credentials, tokens, and authentication procedures. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63 version 1.0.2 (NIST800-63) outlines four (4) levels of assurance, ranging in confidence level from low to very high. The level of assurance provided is measured by the strength and rigor of the identity proofing process, the strength of the token used to authenticate the identity claim, and the management processes the Identity Provider applies to it. These four Assurance Levels have been adopted by the U.K. government, the Government of Canada and the U.S. Federal Government for categorizing electronic identity trust levels for providing electronic government services. These Assurance Levels are also recognized and referenced in the Kantara Initiative Identity Assurance Framework.
In order to conduct business in an online world, entities need to be able to identify themselves remotely and reliably. In most cases, however, it is not sufficient for the typical electronic credential (usually a basic userID/password pair or a digital certificate) to simply make the assertion that "I am who I say I am - believe me." A relying party (RP) needs to be able to know to some degree of certainty that the presented electronic identity credential truly represents the individual presenting the credential. In the case of self-issued credentials, this isn't possible. However, most electronic identity credentials are issued by identity providers (IdPs): the workplace network administrator, a social networking service, an online game administrator, a government entity, or a Trusted Third Party that sells digital certificates. Most people have multiple credentials from multiple providers. Four separate audiences are affected by the transaction---and the inherent trust therein:
Different IdPs follow different policies and procedures for issuing electronic identity credentials. In the business world, and especially in government, the more trustworthy the credential, the more stringent the rules governing identity proofing, credential management and the kind of credentials issued. But while different IdPs follow their own rules, more and more end users (often called subscribers) and online services (often called relying parties) wish to trust existing credentials and not issue yet another set of userID/passwords or other credentials for use to access one service. This is where the concept of Federated Identity becomes important. Federated Identity provides IdPs and relying parties with a common set of identity trust conventions that transcend individual identity service providers, users, or networks, so that a relying party will know it can trust a credential issued by IdP 'A' at a level of assurance comparable to a common standard, which will also be agreed upon by IdPs 'B,' 'C,' and 'D.' Several presentations on the application of the Identity Assurance Framework have been given by various organizations, including Wells Fargo and Fidelity Investments, and case studies about Aetna and Citigroup are also available.
For example, in 2009, the South East Michigan Health Information Exchange (SEMHIE) has adopted the Kantara Initiative Identity Assurance Framework (IAF) as its open trust framework. [1]
The Kantara Initiative Identity Assurance Work Group (IAWG) was formed in 2009 to foster adoption of identity trust services. It continued the advancement of the Liberty Alliance Identity Assurance Framework, which was based, in part, on the Electronic Authentication Partnership Trust Framework and the US E-Authentication Federation Credential Assessment Framework, initiatives designed for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability among electronic authentication systems. As such, it defined a trust framework around the quality of claims issued by an IdP based on language, business rules, assessment criteria and certifications. The work began within the Liberty Alliance in early 2007, and the first public draft was published in November 2007, with version 1.1 released in June 2008. Work is ongoing within the Liberty Alliance. The Identity Assurance Expert Group within Liberty Alliance is also working collaboratively on identity assurance with the ITU-T (via the ITU-T SG17Q6 Correspondence Group on X.EAA on harmonization and international standardization of the Identity Assurance Framework---work commenced Sept. 2008); ISOC (ISO SC27 29115 Harmonization with Identity Assurance Framework, among other contributions); and the American Bar Association (collaboration to develop a model trade agreement for federated identity).
The Kantara Initiative Identity Assurance Framework (IAF), published in December 2009, consists of many different documents that detail the levels of assurance and the certification program that bring the Framework to the marketplace. The IAF consists of a set of documents that includes an Overview publication, the IAF Glossary, a summary Assurance Levels document, and an Assurance Assessment Scheme (AAS), which encompasses the associated assessment and certification program, as well as several subordinate documents, among them the Service Assessment Criteria (SAC), which establishes baseline criteria for general organizational conformity, identity proofing services, credential strength, and credential management services against which all CSPs will be evaluated.